Explaining the October 14, 1973, Battle of Mansoura for the first time on an interactive map. The only map of the battle, exclusively.

Israeli aircraft cannot enter the Delta via the Suez Canal because our missile shield exists along the entire canal from Port Said to Suez. They cannot come from the south via the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea and then ascend to the Delta because that wastes their fuel. They cannot come via the Mediterranean near Alexandria because that area is also protected by air defense missiles, and it also wastes their fuel due to the long distance. The only place they could enter the Delta was via the Mediterranean, east of Baltim, in an area called the Sabkhas, belonging to Kafr El Sheikh Governorate. The Sabkhas were not protected by air defense missiles. It was impossible to cover the entire Egyptian depth with missile bases. There was a gap in that location, and we knew it. There were always aerial patrols protecting that area, visual surveillance, and all Israeli penetrations into the Delta throughout the war came from that location. The Egyptian command knew this well, and there was no element of surprise for Israeli penetrations into the Delta throughout the war. The airbases in the Delta that housed MiG-21 fighters were Mansoura Air Base, the main command center, Abu Suweir Air Base, and Inshas Air Base. These three bases had six MiG-21 squadrons—two squadrons per base. There were also some MiG-21 aircraft defending Tanta Air Base, but they did not reach squadron strength. All these airbases were protected by air defense missiles and anti-aircraft guns. The Israeli plan was as follows: The first wave of the attack consisted of 20 Phantom aircraft flying close to the shores of Port Said, within radar range. The Israelis intentionally allowed Egyptian radars to detect these aircraft so that the Egyptian command would believe Israel was launching a major air attack on Port Said. Then, Egyptian fighters would rush out from the Delta airbases to engage the Israeli fighters and protect Port Said. When the Egyptian fighters arrived, they would find not just 20 Phantoms, but would also be surprised by the presence of 20 Mirage III aircraft positioned over the sea opposite Port Said, flying at a very low altitude, outside radar range, thus invisible on radar screens. This would surprise the Egyptian fighters in an aerial ambush, leading to the downing of the largest possible number of MiG-21s in this battle. Simultaneously, the second wave of aircraft would be positioned opposite Baltim.